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I. Introduction
In recent years, policymakers have become increasingly concerned about the
adverse effects of capital income taxation on capital accumulation. At the same time, the
growing international integration has led to increased attention to how 6scal policies
impact international capital and trade flows. This study explores the macrceconomic
effects of two alternative policies aimed at stimulating domestic investment. The fïrst is
a reduction in the source-based capital income tax (CI'T) and the second the introduction
of an investment tax credit (TTC). These policies have been analyzed in a closed-
economy setting by Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) and Goulder and Summers (1990),
who adopted numerical intertemporal equilibrium models with, respectively, overlapping
generations and a representative infinitely-lived household. The present paper extends
their analysis to an analytical overlapping generations model of a small open e~nomy
that is integrated in world financial markets. Behavioral relationships are grounded in
intertemporal optimization and the model solves for a full intertemporal equilibrium with
perfect foresight. Accordingly, the study integrates, on the one hand, traditional public
finance issues, such as intertemporal efficiency and intergenerational and international
incidence, and, on the other hand, macrceconomic effects of fiscal policies on investment,
saving, consumption, net foreign assets, the external current account, and the trade
balance.
In order to analyze the effects of investment-promoting policies on the external
current account, one can employ the identiry between the current account balance and
the difference between domestic saving and domestic investment. The conventional
wisdom from this identity is that, in an integrated world financial market, an increase in
investment brought about by investment incentives will result in a deterioration of the
external current account. In this connection, Summers (1986) argues that, in a world of
international capital mobiliry, it is crucial to distinguish between, on the one hand,
policies that stimulate domestic saving, and, on the other hand, those targeted at
promoting domestic investment because these two different types of policies are likely
to exert opposite effects on domestic absorption and the external current account.
Bovenberg (1989) shows, however, that international capital mobility is not a sufficient
condition for investment incentives to worsen the initial current account by boosting
short-run domestic absorption. In particular, if foreign and domestic commodities are
imperfect substitutes in demand, domestic capital accumulation may raise domestic
saving on account of both a rise in real interest rates and the anticipation of a terms-of-
trade loss.
The present paper complements the analysis in Bovenberg (1989) by identifying
two other channels through which investment-promoting policies affect domestic saving
and consumption, namely intergenerational and international distributional effects.
Whereas it does not allow for imperfect substitutability between commodities, this paper
extends the analysis in Bovenberg (1989) in two directions. First, the paper adopts the
overlapping generations models developed by Yaari (1965), Blanchard (1984, 1985) and
Weil (1989) to model consumption behavior. In contrast to the household model of a
representative infinitely-lived agent employed by Bovenberg (1989), the overlapping
generations model allows for a meaningful role of intergenerational transfers and,
therefore, dces not exhibit debt-neutrality. This model has been used to explore the
effects of the intergenerational transfers associated with budget deficits, but the cutrent
paper applies it to show how the distributional effects of alternative tax systems impact2
aggregate saving and, therefore, the external current account (see also Engel and Kletzer
(1990)). The model also enables us to explore the sensitivity of the resulu with respect
to the degree of disconnededness of the generations.
The second extension involves foreign ownership of the domestic capital stock.
In the presence of foreign ownership, unanticipated domestic policies can affect foreign
wealth and net foreign assets by changing the value of the domestic capital stock. Hence,
this extension enables the paper to analyze how this implicit taxation or subsidiation of
the foreign owners of the domestic capital stock impacts the international distribution
of wealth, net foreign assets, and the external current acoount and trade balances.
The two extensions result in important differences between the two investment-
promoting policies. Intuitively, given a certain objective for capital accumulation, a
reduction in the CIT yields a higher value of the domestic capita! stock and lower after-
tax wages than the TTC. Accordingly, compared to the ITC, a lower CIT benefits the
owners ofthe domestic capital stock and hurts wage earners. If domestic households own
the domestic capital stock in the initial equilibrium, current generations at home gain at
the expense of future generations because they capitalize the higher after-tax capital
earnings but, given the overlapping generation structure, absorb only part of the lower
wages. However, if foreigners own the domestic capital stock initially, foreigners gain
while domestic households -- especially the cvrrently alive - lose.
A growing body of literature has investigated the effects of capital income
taxation in intertemporal equilibrium models ihat allow for international capital mobility
(see, e.g., Frenkel and Razin (1987)). The present study differs from previous studies in
several important respects. Most importantly, it combines adjustment cosu in irnestment
with overlapping generations determining saving behavior. In contrast to Frenkel and
Razin (1986ab) and van Wijnbergen (1986), it introduces endogenous investment, capital
accumulation, and output, and therefore can explore the interaction between capital
accumulation, consumption, and saving. Whereas Keuschnigg (1991) and Engel and
Kletzer (1990) introduce capital accumulation in a model with overlapping generations,
these papers assume that physical capital is perfectly mobile internationally. However,
the present study distinguishes between, on the one hand, perfect mobility of financial
capital, and, on the other hand, imperfect mobility of physical capital. In particulaz,
adjustment costs in investment prevent physical capital from instantaneously relocating
between countries. The incorporation of adjustment costs allows for a more realistic
assessment of the response of investment, and, therefore, the external current account
and trade balances. It has also important implications for the intergenerational
distribution of resources, and, therefore, saving behavior.
lipton and Sachs (1983), Goulder and Eichengreen (1989), and Sen and
Turnovsky (1990) allow for endogenous investment with adjustment costs in
intertemporal equilibrium models of open economies. However, these models do not
incorporate (disconnected) overlapping generations. The current paper reveals that the
interaction between, on the one hand, adjustment costs in capital accumulation and, on
the other hand, overlapping generations determining saving behavior, plays a crucial role
in uansmitting shocks in domestic investment to domestic saving.
The model differs from numerical studies (See, e.g. lipton and Sachs (1983),
Keuschnigg (1991), Soderlind (1990), and Goulder and Eichengreen (1989)) in presenting
analytical solutions that have an intuitive interpretation. These solutions explicitly reveal
how several major structural parameters affect the transmission ofirnestment-promoting
policies to saving, investment, and the external trade and current acxounts. In particvlar,3
it identifies the roles of, among others, adjustment costs in investment, the birth rate of
new generations, foreign ownership of domestic capital, substitution between labor and
capital in domestic production, the initial tax rate on capital income, and the rate of
return on world capital markets.
Most analytical studies of intertemporal equilibrium models of open economies
formulate two-period models (see, e.g., Frenkel and Razin (1986c) and van Wijnbergen
(1986)). The current paper, in contrast, explores the entire transition path to a new long-
run equilibrium. The results reveal that a two-period structure, which incorporates only
short-run and long-run results, cannot fully chazacterize the dynamics ofthe adjustment
path. For example, a poliry shock may benefit the generations Wat aze alive at the time
the poliry is implemented and the generations that are born when the economy
approaches its new long-run equilibrium. However, generations born during the transition
may lose. In this connection, the study identifies several non-monotonic adjustment paths.
Furthermore, compared to two-period models, the multiperiod model allows for a more
realistic evaluation of the intertemporal impact of fiscal policies.
In incorporating both adjustment costs in investment and overlappinggenerations
in an analytical intertemporal equilibrium model of a small open economy, the current
study is closely related to Nielsen and Sorensen (1991). This latter paper examines
several tax instruments, including the two investment-promoting policies explored here.
However, it assumes that both foreign ownership and the initial tax rate on capital
income are zero and, therefore, cannot investigate the international distribution and
intertemporal efficienry effects and their macroeconomic implications.l Fttrtltermore,
compazed to Nielsen and Sorensen (1991), the present paper pays more attention to the
interpretation ofthe adjustment dynamicx. Moreover, it examines the roles of public debt
poliry and the composition of the investment-promoting policies in ensuring that these
policies are Pareto improving.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II outlines the main
elements of the intertemporal equilibrium model. Section III examines the solutions
derived from the capital accumulation side of the model, which are used in Section IV
to explore the consequences of the two policies for the intergenerational distribution of
welfare. Sections V and VI investigate the effectson, respectively, aggregate consumption
and saving. Combining the implications for consumption, saving, and investment, one
finds the consequences for the trade performance and the net foreign asset position,
which are explored in Section VII. Numerical simulations in Section VIII illustrate the
quantitative importance ofthe macroeconomic effects discussed in the previous sections.
Section IX analyzes three alternativeways to amve at investment-promoting policies that
are Pareto improving by properly controlling for international and intergenerational
distributional impacts. Section X presents the main conclusions.
t In contrast to the present paper, Nielsen and Sorensen impose the restridion tóat the world rate of
interest exceeds the discount rate.4
II. The model
Il.l Consnmption and saving behavior
The saving and consumption side of the model consists of an overlapping
generations model due to Buiter (1988), whicó is a combination of a version developed
by Yaari (1965) and Blanchard (1984,1985) and aversion due to Weil (1989). Following
the Yaari-Blanchazd model, each household faoes a constant probability ofpassing away,
B.Z In the absence of an operative bequest motive, each household ptuchases (or sells)
an annuity that pays a rate of return, B. Accordingly, the real rate of return earned by
a household on its financial wealth is the sum of the real rate of retttrn on world capital
markets,r, and the probability of death, 9.
New households that arenot linked through operative intergenerational transfers
to older households are born at a constant rate, (n tB)3 This birth rate measures the
heterogeneity, or economic disconnectedness, of the population (see Weil (1989)). Both
the total population and labor supply grow at the rate n because all households
inelastically supply the same amount of labor.4 At time tZV, the representative
household of the generation born at time v ma~mizes the expected value of additive
sepazable utility, adopting a subjective discount rate, S:
m
U(v,t) - fu(c(v,s)) e ~s-`) e~('~) ds
r




where c(v,t) and a(v,t) represent, respectively, oonsumption and financial wealth per
capita at time t 2 v of the generation born at time v. A dot above a variable denotes a
time derivative. This paper assumes that every living household supplies one unit of
2 One can also interpret this constant probability of deató as the probability that a dynasty expires. By
allowing for A ~0, one can allow for intra-0ynasty growth.
3 Weil (1989) interprets this birth rate as the rate at which new dynasties enter the domeatie economy.
7'his rate depeads on the proportion of newly-born children who are ~t 'loved'.
~ Hence, tbe birth rate, n t 6, and the death rate, 9, are distind in tLis model. Blanchard (19b4, 19d5),
in contrast, assumca that thc birth rate equals the dealh rate (i.e. n-0), whik Weil (1989) abstracta from
deató (i.e. 8 - 0 ).5
homogeneous labor per capita and receives the same lump-sum transfer per capita,which
can vary over time. Hence, non-capital disposable income (which is the sum of before-tax
wages and lump-sum transfers) per capita is age independent. It can be interpreted as
the return to human capital and is denoted by ~(t). The intertemporal substitution
elasticity of consumption is given by the reciprocal of the ooeffïcient of relative risk
aversion, o --cu"(c)~u'(c). The domestic eeonomy is assumed to be small relative to
the rest of the world. Accordingly, the real rate of return, r, is fixed by world capital
markets.
The optimization problem yields the following consumption function:
c(v,t) a O~a(v,t);h(t)~ (2.3)
h(t) represents per capita human wealth at time r, which is identical for all agents alive
at that time because non-capital income dces not depend on age:
m
h(t) ' J~~(S)le ~'~)(s~) ds (2.4)
r
Also the propensity to consume out of total wealth, 0, is age independent because all
agents feature the same time horizon:
~ z rrB - r~ (2~
v
Following Blanchard (1984, 1985), one can aggregate across generations to amve at
expressions in terms of per capita aggregate variables:
C(t) - ~[A(t) }H(t)] a 0 WCr)
~4(t) - (r-n)i1(t) t u~(t) -C(t)
(Z.~
(2.7)
where the per capita aggregate variables are derived from the per capita generation-
specif"ic variables as follows:6
r
X(t) z j x(y,s)(nt6)e ~n'6)(tw) dv X~ Crl
-Jm
x - c,a
and N(t) 3 h(t) . R'(t) - A(t) t N(t) correspondstoper capita aggregate wealth per capita
at time t .
II.2 Production and investment
A neo-classical net production function represents a constant-returns-to-scale technology
Y 'f(k)
(2.9)
where y corresponds to output per capita (net of depreciation) of the single tradable
commodity and k stands for the capital-labor rado.s The marginal productivity condition
for labor represents the demand for labor:
w ~ f(k) -kf'(k) (Z.10)
where w represents the before-tax wage rate and f'(k) - df(k)~dk. In addition to the
production technology (2.9), the production sector faces a second technology constraint -
- the installation function. This function was introduced by Uzawa (1969) to model
adjustment costs associated with investment6 With the labor force growing at the raten
and labor being immobile internationally, this installation ftmction can be written as (see,
e.g., Bovenberg (1986)):
k- k~g(x) -n~ g'(x) ~ 0 g"(x) ~ 0
t.
(Z.I1)
5 In the rest of tbis paper, unless indicated otherwise, variables are to be understood as dated at time
6 Following Lucas (196~, Summers (1981) modek adjustmeot coets in an ahernative way. His
formulatioq however, leads to similar results for the optimal investment rule.where x is the ratio of net investment to the capital stock. Marginal installation costs rise
with the rate of investment, which is reflected in the rnncavity of the installation function
in investment. How rapidly costs increase is minored by the elasticity of the margirtal
productivity of investment aX, defined as
o n-x8 (x)
x g.(x) (2.12)
For any given capital stock, the faster the capital stock expands, the more capital goods
per additional unit of capital are required.
Firms are equity financed and maximiu the present value of their after-tax cash
flow subject to the installation function:
m
V - ~[(1-tk)(f(k)-w)-(1-tt)xkJe-(r-,~~ dt
0
(2.13)
where tk stands for the rate of source-based~ tax on capital income (net of
depreciation)8 and t~ represents the subsidy to net investment. Optimization gives rise
to the optimal path for the shadow price of capital, q:
9 - . - g(x) -
(l~k)f'(k) } (1-r~k
9 4 4




~ The corporate income tax is mainly source based. In particular, tóe caporate tax system in the hoat
country (i.e. the country wóere the investment occurs) determinea the ettedive corporate tax rate on
mar~nal investment if foreigners fmance these iuveatments tórough portfolio capital tlows. Even in the caae
of dired iaveatments, the corporate tax may be effectively source baaed,for einmpk, if the residence country
has a territorial system of corpora[e ta~ration.
e T6e tax on capital income is assumed to be assessed on income net of bue economic depreáation.8
11.3 Covernment
The overlapping generations model causes Ricardian equivalence to fail.
Accordingly, thc intertemporal equilibrium is affected by óowthe gavernment distributes
the financing burden of the investment-promoting policies across (disconnected)
generations. This paper assumes that the government balances its bud~et at each point
in time by levying a common lump-sum tax on every living household. This lump-sum
tax can also be interpreted as a tax on labor because per capita labor supply is age-
independent and inelastic. Under the assumption that the government dces not issue
debt, the after-tax return to human capital (or after-tax labor earnings) amounts to:
~ a w;tkkf'(k)-trxk (2.1~
II.4 The model solution
This paper explores the local behavior of the small open economy around the
initial steady state by log-linearizing the model around the initial balanced growth
path.lo Unless otherwise indicated, a tilde (-) above a variable stands for the change
in this variable relative to its initial steady-state value. As regards the two tax rates, tildes
are de5ned as follows:
k ~d(1-tk) ~ 0 l
(1-tk)




In the initial steady state, the imestment subsidy is zero (t~ - 0). The investment-
promoting policies examined here are unanticipated and permanent. They are
implemented at ts0 and normalized so that they yield the same change in capital
intensity. This implies (see Section III):
9 Section D{, óowever, allow~s for public debt finaociog.
to For similar approacbes, aee, o.g.,ludd (1985) and Bovenberg (1986).9
ikz-t~~0 (2.19)
The model is solved recursively. First, the log-linearized investment model yields the time
paths for the capital stock, the shadow price of capital, investment, and before-tax wages
(see Appendix A). Combining these solutions with the gover~nment budget constraint, one
derives the development of after-tax wages (see Appendix A), which is used to solve the
saving side of the model (see Appendix B).
III. The investment system
III.a Capital accumulation
The investment system yields the following solution for long-run capital
deepening (see Appendix A):
0
k(~) - f l~k (tk~l)
(3.1)
where ak represents the share of capital inrnme (net of depreciation) in domestic net
income. The effectiveness of the investment-promoting policies in terms of capital
accumulation depends importantlyon the substitutionelasticity between capital and labor
in net production, ak. Intuitively, a large elasticity reduces the sensitivity of the marginal
product of capital with respect to increases in the capital stock. Hence, a substantial
expansion of the capital stock is required to reduce the after-tax return to capital to the
fixed world rate of return.
During the transition, the capital-labor ratio is given by
k(t) - k(~)~1-e ~~)
(3.2)
The adjustment speed h corresponds to the rate of convergence of the capital stock to
its new steady-state value and is given by (see Appendiic A):
h - -'fz t ~ Y. t
(1-tk)ak.Rl(1-ak) (3.3)
r-n ox.ok.z z10
where QI denotes the net investment share in net income and z ~(1-rk~k~a~ 2 0 is
the shaze of the after-tax cash flow in domesdc net income. A less ooncave installation
function, which reflects more elastic imestment, yields a higher adjustment speed. The
adjustment speed approaches infinity if adjustment costs aze absent (i.e., oxa0 ). This case
corresponds to perfectly mobile physical ca~ital. ~e case of a fixed factor, in contrast,
is represented by a zero adjustment speed. t
The investment system yields solutions for the value of the domestic capital stock
and the time path of after-tax wages. The rest of this section discu.sses these solutions.
III.b. The vaíue of the domestic capital stock
The short-run consequences for the value ofthe capital stock, q(0), indicate the
shifting of the lower tax burden on capital (see Appendix A):
4(0) - I r~ I(l~k~k ~k-rl) ' tl
(3.4)
lr-nthl z
The owners of the domesdc capital stock gain from a lower CIT. The magnitude of this
benefit depends on the size of the adjustment speed relative to that of the effective
discount rate (rn). The faster after-tax capital earnings fall back to the fixed level in
the rest of the world and the less heavily the long-run changes in capital earnings are
discounted, the smaller the capitaliud gain in capital income becomes. Only with
instantaneous relocation of capital to the home country (i.e. hy~ ) dces capital
completely shift the lower tax btuden to labor (see also Bovenberg (1986)).
Whether the ITC raises the value ofdomesdc capital depends on the relationship
between the speed of capital accumulation and the effecdve discount rate. In contrast
to a lower CTT, the TTC may hurt the awners of the capital stock if the adjustment speed
is sufficiently high relative to the discount rata Intuitively, the IT'C inidally boosts capital
earnings at the expense of lower after-taxwages. As capital accumulates, however, capital
earnings fall below, while after-tax wages rise above their initial levels (see below).
Discounted capital eaznings fall if rapid capital accumulation causes a fast drop in capital
earnings and if the lower capital earnings are not discounted at a high rate.
The ITC hurts the owners of the domestic capital stock if low adjustment costs,
which are reflected by a low degree of concavity of the installation function, cause rapid
capital accumulation. In these circumstances, the 1TC decreases the value of the
domestic capital stock because it reduces the price of new capital goods, which are a
close substitute for the installed capital stock if adjustment costs aze low (see also
Summers (1981)).
n (~am~ey aud Wright (lgg~ e~mine how an uoanticipated tax on a fixed fador affeds
intergenerationalincideece.11
III.c Domestic ónancial capital
How financial wealth of domestic households, A(0), is affected by changes in the
value of the domestic capital stock depends on the share of the domestic capital stock
that is initially owned by domestic households, sk:
A(0) ' S,tz9(~) (3.5)
Here il is defined as
ft - (r-n) ~ (3.6)
Y
III.d I.abor eamings
The time path of after-tax labor earnings is derived from the investment system
under the assumption that the government dces not use debt finance (see Appendix A):
~(t) - ~(~)e -tu ~ ir(„)(1-e -~u) (3.~
a„ca(0) - -(1-tt)attt - a~(-tf)





where aW z(1-ak) t tkak denotes the share of after-tax labor earnings (including
transfers) in domestic net income. Initially, net wages fall on account of the budgetary
costs of the investment-promoting policies. The lower CTT reduces after-tax wages more
than the ITC dces. The reason is that this policy involves larger budgetary costs berause
it applies a lower tax burden not only to marginal investment but also to existing capital.
Following their initial drop, net wages start to rise as the gradual accumulation of capital
raises the marginal productivity of labor. In the long run, net wages exceed their initial
steady-state value if the initial tax rate on capital is positive (tk ~ 0). This long-run rise
in wages reflects the efficienry gain that is due to a lower intertemporal distortion. Even
in the absence of an initial distortion, the ITC causes long-run net wages to rise above12
their initial steady-state value. In that case, a lower CTT retun~ts long-run wages only to
their initial value. Intuitively, in the long run, lower capital income taxes are completely
shifted to labor in the form of higher before-tax wages because capital is perfectly mobile
in the long run. Therefore, in the new steady state, higher before-taa wages exactly offset
the higher lump-sum taxes that are required to finance the budgetary costs of the lower
CIT.
Discounting the solution for the pató ofwages yields the ahort-run consequences
for human wealth of domestic households, H(0):
(3.10)
a"f~(fl) s ~h~}B I tkak~ loa I- I~~ I (1-tk)a!k (~k-rl) t z(-tl)
J kJ l J
A lower CIT reduces the value of human capital if the initial CTT is zero. The slower
wages rise as a result of sluggish capital accumulation and the higher the discount rate
against which wages aze discounted, rtB, the larger the decline in initial human capital
becomes. In the presence of an initial tax distortion (tk ~ 0), a lower CTT may boost
human capital if capital deepening happens quickly. Intuitively, rapital accumulation
increases before-tax wages rapidly enough to compensate workers for higher wage taxes
finanàng the lower CTT, as the lower intertemporal distortion yields overall gains in
effiàenry.
Compazed to a lower CIT, the TfC is more benefiàal for human capital. Even
in the absence of an initial intertemporal distortion, dces the TTC increase the value of
human capital ifrapid capital accumulation cattses the return to huatan capital to quickly
rise above its initial level and if this eventual rise in wages is not discounted at a high
rate. Indeed, the human capital effect mirrors the consequences for the value of domestic
capital discussed above. However, it is important to note that wages are discounted at
a higher rate than capital earnings are. While the current owners of the capital stock
capitalize all future capital earnings, the domestic households that are currently alive fail
to intemalize the wages that accrue to yet-to-be-born generations. Hence, households
apply a higher discount rate to wage earnings than to capital earnings. The higher the
rate at which new generations emerge, as reflected in the sum of the rates ofpopulation
growth, n, and probability of death, B, the larger the gap between the effective discount
rates for finanàal and human capital becomes. In that case, the population is
heterogeneous and the time horizons of current generadons are short compared to the
horizon of the economy at large.
IV. T'be intergenerational distribution
This section first explores how the investment-promoting poliàes affect the real
values of fínanàal and human capital of the generations that aze alive when the policy
change occurs. It then examines also how the poliàes impact the real wealth positions
of generations that are yet to be born at the time these poliàes are implemented.13
IV.a The currently alive
The effect on real wealth of the generations that are alive when the investment-
promoting policies aze implemented, I~(0)12, is found by combining the effects on
human and financial capital owned by domestic households (expressions (3.5) and (3.10)
respectively):
e l r~ Ja` ~(0)
v~h}r}B~ `~k 1~ ~k-t,) } a
k
(4.1) 1-t
Sk(n~) [r.etlt, (i-ntít) (tk- tl) - (r-rt)(-rI) }
(1 sk) ~ - fr.e}hl (1-rk)ak(ik-t~) . z(-i~)~
where a~ stands for the shaze of rnnsumption in domestic net income. This expression
is interpreted below by distinguishing between the case in which domesdc households
own the entire domestic capital stock (i.e. sk~l ) and the case in which foreigners own
the entire stock (i.e. sk~). If foreigners initially own only a part of the domestic capital
stock, the domestic welfare effect is given by the weighted average of the two cases
examined here. Table 1 summarizes the discussion below.
Without [oreign ownership
A lower CIT benefits current generations. The first term at the right-hand side
of (4.1) stands for a ptue efficienry gain, which is due to a lower intertemporal distortion.
This effect becomes large if the substitution elasticity between labor and capital is lazge
and the installation function is not very concave (and, therefore, the adjustment speed
is high). Under these circumstances, capital accumulation is sensitive to the intertemporal
distortion. A reduction in this distortion, therefore, yields a substantial gain in efficienry.
The terms on the second line in (4.1) represent the intergenerational
distributional effect. Current generations gain from a lower CIT because this poliry
benefits capital at the expense of labor. Whereas current generations capitalize higher
capital earnings, they do not fully internalize the fall in labor earnings becattse lower
wages are in pazt absorbed by future generations.
Current generations beneitt most from the intergenerational distributional effect
if the rate of birth, n.B, is high and capital accumulation occurs only slowly (i.e., h is
small). A low speed of capital accumulation causes capital earnings to fall only slowly
t2 ~y effed oa real wealth provides a meaaw~e for tóe average consequencts for the welfare of the
currently alive. How tóe poGcies affect [he welfare of currently-alive generations with different ages depend
on howthe owvership of[he domestic capital stock is distributed across different sge goupa wéen tóe poócy
shock occurs.14
after their initial rise, thereby raising discounted capital earnings, which accrue to the
currently alive. A high birth rate implies that the currently alive beaz only a small part
of the lower return to human capital. Hence, while a high adjustment speed and a low
birth rate raise the impact on efficiency, they reduce the effect on the intergenerational
distribution. Intuitively, elastic behavior, which is reflected in a high speed of adjustment,
dampens distributional impacts but raises efficienry effects. Furthermore, a low birth rate
implies that the population is homogenous and that current generadons internaliu a
large part of changes in overall welfare. Accordingly, the weli`aze of current generations
depends more on overall efficiency and less on the distribution of labor income over
time. Note that the intergenerational distnbutional effect originates in the interaction of,
on the one hand, adjustment costs in imestment and, on the other hand, (disconnected)
overlapping generations. T~tis effect would not occur in a model with either a
representative agent (i.e., Btn~O) or perfectly mobile physical capital (i.e. hti~).
Whether the ITC benefits the currently alive depends on the parameters of the
model. The efficienry effect, which is represented by the first term in (4.1), dominates
if the birth rate is small and the initial distortion is large due to the combination of a
high initial tax rate on capital income and a high subsdtution elasticity in production. In
that case, the ITC boosts real wealth of the current generations. If the birth rate is high
or the initial distortion is small, however, the intergenerational distributional effect
determines the welfare of these generations. The sign of the intergenerational effect of
the TTC depends importantly on the speed of capital accumuladon. Whereas current
generations lose from the TTC if the adjustment speed is high, they benefit if this speed
is low. Intuitively, a low adjustment speed boosts capital earnings, which aze fully
capitalized by current generations. At the same dme, it implies lower labor earnings,
whicó are in part shifted to future generations, because a lower adjustment speed slows
down the rate at which capital accumulation raises the return to human capital.
Compared to a lower CIT, the ITC is less benefïcial for current generations.
The cvrrently alive are indifferent between the two investment-promoting policies only
if they fully internalize the welfare of future generations (i.e., n t6-0).
With foreign ownership
Foreign ownership dces not affect the efficienry gains from capital accumulation
that accrue to domestic households. The reason is that immobile labor rather than
capital absorbs these gains in the form of lower tax payments. However, foreign
ownership fundamentally changes the economic implications of policies that alter the
distribution between labor and capital. Without foreign ownership, current generations
at home benefit from policies that distribute wealth away from labor towazd capital, such
as a lower CTT. If foreigners own the domestic capital stock, however, the higher capital
earnings accrue to foreign rather than domestic households.
Whereas withour foreign ownership domestic current generations gain from a
lower CTT, wuh foreign ownership they lose as long as the efficienry effect is small.
Furthermore, in the absence of foreign ownership, a low speed of capital accumulation
benefits these generations because it boosts disoounted capital earnings by slowing down
the fall in capital earnings. In the presence of foreign ownership, in contrast, they sufferIs
from slow capital accumulation. The reason is that foreigners rather than current
generations at home absorb the changes in capital earnings if they own the entire
domestic capital stock. Consequently, policies affect domestic generadons only through
changes in net wages. Hence, the slower wages rise following their initial drop, the lazger
the loss in welfare experienced by domesdc households.
In the absence of foreign ownership, domestic households that are currently alive
lose from the ITC if the speed of capital accumulation is high and the efficiency effect
is small. If, in these circumstances, foreigners own the domesdc capital stock, in contrast,
current generations at home may gain. If capital accumulation happens rapidly, the ITC
reduces the value of the domestic capital stock while it raises disoounted wages (i.e. the
value of human capital) of the currently alive as long as the birth rate is not too high.
Accordingly, whether or not domestic current households gain from the TTC depends on
their initial ownership share of the domestic capital stock. If they initially own the entire
stock, they absorb all windfall losses and therefore, they lose. However, if they do own
a smaller shaze, they lose less. If they do not own any part of the domestic capital stock,
the ITC amounts to an implicit tax on foreigners and domestic households may gain due
to the rise in the value of human capital.
IV.b Future generations
The time path for after-tax labor earnings is the only determinant of the effects
on welfare of future generations, which are not yet born at the time of the policy shock.
These generations depend entirely on wage inrnme because they begin their lives without
any fmancial wealth. The consequences for (human) wealth of the generation born at
time t z 0 are given by:
N(t) - ~(fi)e,ru ' w(~)(1--e ~`) (4.2)
The initial change in human wealth, H(0), corresponds to the effect on the welfare of
the generation that is born at the time of the policy shock. The welfare consequences for
generations that are born when the economy approaches its new balanced growth path
are given by the long-run effect on net wages.
If there is no initial intertemporal distortion, a lower CIT hurts future
generations by reducing net wages. The generations that are born soon after the policy
shock suffer the heaviest because labor earnings decline most immediately after the CTT
is reduced. Compared to a lower CIT, the TTC is less harmful to future generations. It
benefits future generations that aze born when the economy approaches its new steady
state and may even benefit all generations born after the TTC takes effect. This is the
case if a high adjustment speed (relative to the discount rate rtB) causes the TTC to
boost initial human capital.16
V. Consumption
This section discusses how economy-wide consumption develops after the two
alternative investment-promoting policies aze implemented. Table 2 contains a summary
of the discussion. Aggregate consumption is given by (see Appendix B):
C(t) - C(0)e ~ ~~ t ~(~)(1-e ~ ~~)
au -h't (5.1)
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Just as subsection IV.a, this section examines the cases without and with initial foreign
ownership in turn.
~thout toreign ownership
ff foreigners do not own any domestic capital in the initial steady state, the
development of domestic consumption depends on the relative magnitudes of, on the one
hand, the gain in overall efficiency and, on the other hand, the change in the
intergenerational distribution. If the first effect dominates, the two investment-promoting
policiesyield similar consumption paths. If r exceeds S, consumption rises monotonically
after its initial rise until it reaches its new steady-state value (see Figure 5.1). If r is
smaller than S, the time path of consumption is non-monotonic: consumption falls after
its initial rise before it increases again neaz the new steady state. Intuitively, the
development of consumption at each point in time depends on the relationship between
the welfaze of the older generations and that of the generations who are born. Economy-
wide consumption rises if and only if newly born generations aze wealthier than the
generations that have already been alive. If S exceeds r, the currently alive own negative
financial wealth and, therefore, are more dependent on labor earnings than newly born
generations aze. Hence, the newly born benefit relatively less from the rise in human
wealth due to the overall efficienry gain, and, therefore, aggregate consumption falls.
Eventually, consumption rises again as the population share of households who ownednegative financial wealth at the time of the policy shock drops off and the development
of consumption depends on the comparison of wealth positions of generations born after
the policy shock. Since wages aze rising, the human wealth of the newly born exceeds
that of the older generations (who are themselves mostly born after the policy shock) and
consumption, therefore, rises.
If the second (intergenerational distribution) effect dominates, the two policies
generate different consumption paths. In pazticular, the time path ofconsttmption is non-
monotonic after the lower CIT is implemented (Figure 5.2). Initially, consumption rises
on account of the improvement in the wealth position of the currently alive. Following
the initial rise, however, consumption starts to fall as the population share rises ofyoung
generations whose real (human) wealth declines because they had not yet been born at
the time the poliry shock and, therefore, did not benefit from higher capital earnings.
Hence, the higher the rate of birth, n;9, is, the faster consumption falls after its initial
rise. If the efficienry effect is small, consumption even falls below its initial steady-state
value, as the generations who were alive when the CTT was reduced die off. Eventually,
however, consumption starts to rise again. If the initial tax rate and, therefore, the (first-
order) efficienry effect is zero, consumption returns to its initial steady-state value. The
eventual rise in consumption is due to the rising trend of wages. Neaz the new steady
state, almost all living generations have been born after the CTTwas reduced. Therefore,
changes in human wealth are the major determinants of the relative wealth positions of
the older and newly born generations. Hence, those who are born near the new steady
state are better off than the older generations because the newly born benefit from
higher human wealth, as wages are rising over time.
Substantial intergenerational effects due to a slow adjustment speed and a high
birth rate strengthen the fluctuations in consumption. If the adjustment speed rises and
the birth rate falls, consumption flattens out (Figure 5.2). Consumption stays constant at
its initial steady state level if the initial tax rate is zero (i.e. no efficienry effect) and the
ratio [h~(ntB)] approaches infinity.
In the absence of ef6cienry effects, the ITC produces the largest swings in
consumption if new generations enter at a high speed and, therefore, intergenerational
distributional effects aze large. The adjustment speed determines the monotonicity ofthe
consumption path (Figure 5.3). If capital accumulation occurs slowly, consumption
develops non-monotonically as the time profile of the consumption path resembles that
after the implementation of a lower CIT. The reason is that under these circumstances
both investment- promoting policies cause the value of financial capital to rise relative
to that of human capital. Consequently, older generations who own the capital stock gain
at the expense of those who aze born immediately after the poliry shock and therefore,
depend on human capital. Consequently, consumption falls after an initial rise.
Eventually, however, oonsumption starts to rise for the reasons discussed above for the
case of a reduction ofthe CTT. In contrast to a lower CIT however, the ITC causes long-
run consumption to rise above its initial level -- even if the efficienry effect is zero.
If capital accumulation occurs rapidly, the TTC yields a different time profile of
the consumption path compared to a lower CTT. In particular, the TTC causes aggregate
consumption to rise monotonically following an initial fall (Figure 5.3)~. Intuitively,
[3 IE the initial tax rate is pcuitive and horizons are loug, initial consumption may rise as the effi~ency
effed is likely to domioate the distributional effed.18
the younger a generation is, the better off it is in terms of welfare. Those who are born
after the TTC is implemented gain relative to those who were alive at the time policy
changed because these younger generations do not suffer a windfall loss on aaount of
a fall in the value of the domestic capital stock. Moreover, the later one is born, the
more one benefits from the rising trend in wages.
With foreign ownership
The shape of the consumption path with foreign ownership depends on the
relative sizes of, on the one hand, the gain in overall efficiency, and, on the other hand,
the international distributional effect on acoount of the change in the distribution
between capital and labor. If the efficiency effed dominates the distributional effect, the
consumption path is similar to that in the case without foreign ownership. Therefore, the
rest of this section assumes that the initial tax rate is zero so that the international
distributional effect dominates.
The time path for consumption following the implementation of a lower CTT is
non-monotonic if domestic households hold positive financial wealth (i.e., r exceeds S)
(see Figure 5.4). The reason is that those who are born at or immediately after the poliry
shock depend more on human wealth than do the older generations who have
accumulated financial wealth. Accordingly, the newly born are hurt most by the decline
in real wages. Therefore, aggregate consumption falls as the newly born aze worse off
than the older generations. Eventually, consumption starts to rise when the population
shaze of those born after the policy change rises and when, therefore, the rising trend in
wages determines the relative wealth positions of the newly born compazed to older
generations. A lower CTT causes consumption to rise monotonically following its initial
fall only if domestic households own negative financial wealth (r ~ S) (see Figure 5.4).
In that case, the share of human wealth in total wealth is larger for the current
generations than for newly born generations. Hence, current generations suffer more
from declining wages than those who are born at or immediately after the policy shock.
Consequently, aggregate consumption rises after the initial fall.
The TTC yields similaz consumption paths as a lower CIT dces if the capital
accumulation occurs slowly and the birth rate is high (see Figure 5.5). In this case,
domestic current generations suffer from an initial fall in wages because capital
accumulation occurs too late to benefit them in the form of higher wages. Just as in the
case of a lower CIT, the TTC causes consumption to rise monotonically only if domestic
households hold negative financial wealth (see above). If the adjustment speed is high
and the birth rate is small, discounted wages of domestic households rise and
consumption increases initially. Consumption continues to rise monotonically if and only
if households hoid positive financial wealth (see Figure 5.5). If fmancial wealth is
positive, young generations gain more than the older ones because of two reasons. First,
they depend the most on hutnan wealth -- the component of wealth that rises in value.
Second, wages rise over time and, therefore, those who are born later are better off.19
VI. Domestic saving
At the time of the unandcipated poliry shock, capitalization effects cause the
value of the financial assets of the domestic households to jump according to expression
(3.5). In the long-run, financial assets are directly related to wages according to:
r~
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During the transition, financial assets are given by (Appendix B):
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This expression together with (3.4), (3.5), (3.8), (3.9), (5.4) and (6.1) yields the response
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This section explores the response of domestic saving by interpreting the time path of
financial assets. It first examines the case without initial foreign ownership of domestic
capital. It then turns to the case in which foreigners own the entire domestic capital stock
when the policy shock occurs. Table 3 provides a summary of the various effects
identified in this section.20
Without toreign ownership
A lower CIT unambiguously reduces saving at the time the policy shock occurs
because expression (6.3) consists of three non-positive parts. The first term at the right
hand side of (6.3) involves the long-run rise in income that is due to the gain in
intertemporal efficienry. If the initial tax rate on capital is positive, households initially
save less because they smooth their consumption intertemporally in anticipation of the
rise in after-tax income that corresponds to the efficiency gain produced by a larger
capital stock. The more capital accumulation occurs within the horizons of the currently
alive (i.e., the speed of capital accumulation, h, is large relative to the birth rate, n}e ),
the larger this negative effect on initial saving becomes.
Ifthe interest rate exceeds the discount rate, the efficienry effect raises financial
assets in the long run as it increases after-tax wages in the new steady state (see
expression (6.1)). Consequently, the short-run decumulation of financial assets on account
of the efficienry effect is only temporary and the path for financial assets is non-
monotonic (see Figure 6.1). The reason is twofold. First, if the economy approaches the
new steady state, the rate at which aggregate income rises on account of the expansion
of the capital stock falls. Hence, domestic households anticipate smaller gains in future
incomes and, therefore, build up their financial assets again. The second factor behind
the eventual rise offinancial assets is that younger generations benefit the most from the
gains in intertemporal efficiency. If the interest rate exceeds the discount rate, financial
wealth rises with age. Accordingly, younger generations depend more on human wealth
than the older generations do and they, therefore, gain most from the gains in
intertemporal efflcienry, which are reflected in rising after-tax wages.
Also the first term on the second line of (6.3) involves consumption smoothing.
Households reduce their financial assets as they expect capital accumula6on to raise
wages by boosting the marginal productivity of labor. Finally, the second term on the
second line of (6.3) stands for the intergenerational distribution effect in favor of current
generations. C~rrent consumption exceeds current income because current generations
base their consumption decisions on their own permanent income, which exceeds that
of the economy at large.
The relative magnitudes of the second and third effects depend on the ratio of
the adjustment speed and the birth rate. Consumption smoothing is most important in
determining initial saving if capital accumulation occurs rapidly and the population is
homogeneous. If, in contrast, most capital accumulation happens beyond the horizons of
the currently alive, the saving impact of the intergenerational redistribution dominates.
If the initial tax rate is zero, financial assets return to their initial value in the
long run after capitalization effects caused an initial increase. Both consumption
smoothing and the intergenerational distribution effect are likely to produce a non-
monotonic decline in financial assets (see Figure 6.2). In particular, rnnsumption
smoothing falls back as the rate at which wages rise falls (see above). Furthermore, the
intergenerational distributional effect on saving reflects the non-monotonic consumption
path discussed in Section V.
Compared to a lower CIT, the TTC yields a stronger performance of domestic
saving. Whereas the two investment-promoting policies share the two consumption-
smoothing components in expression (6.3), they yield a different term for the saving
effect of changes in the intergenerational distribution. In contrast to a lower CTT, the
TTC may boost saving. This happens if the TTC benefits future generations at the expense21
of the currently alive and if this intergenerational distributional effect dominates the two
consumption-smoothing terms discussed above. This is the case if capital accumulation
occurs rapidly and if a high birtó rate indicates that the population is heterogeneous. In
these circumstances, consumption smoothing is less important because horizons are short.
At the same time, the intergenerational distributional effect is large and boosts saving
as cunent generations experience a windfall loss on acrnunt of a decline in the value of
physical capital.
If the interest rate exceeds the dis~unt rate and the TTC causes saving to rise
on impact, financial assets continue to rise monotonically after an initial fall and rise
above their initial value in the new steady state (see Figure 6.3). Ifsaving falls on impact,
financial assets are likely to develop non-monotonically as saving rises near the steady
state for the reasons discussed in the lower CIT case.
Witó [oreign ownership
The degree of foreign ownership does not affect the saving effect of a gain in
intertemporal efficienry. Hence, the rest of this section assumes that the initial tax rate,
and therefore the efficienry effect, is zero. if foreigners own the entire domestic capital
stock, initial changes in the value of domestic capital stock are no longer transmitted to
the value of domestic financial assets, which are, therefore, fixed in the short run.
In the absence of efficiency gains, a lower CIT impacts the level of domestic
financial assets neither in the short nor the long run. However, financial assets are lilcely
to fall below their initial level during the transition, as domestic households smooth their
consumption in anticipation of rising wages. Financial assets experience a transitional rise
above their initial level only if the discount rate exceeds the interest rate and, at the
same time, capital accumulation occurs slowly. In that case, wages rise only slowly and
consumption smoothing is less important. At the same time, the currently alive lose most
from the decline in after-tax wages that is due to the budgetary costs of the lower CTT
because, if the discount rate exceeds the interest rate, they depend most on human
wealth.
The ITC produces a higher level of domestic financial assets than a lower CIT
dces if the interest rate exceeds the discount rate. In that case, in contrast to a lower
CTI', the TTC raises financial assets in the long run. Nevertheless, saving still falls on
impact because households anticipate rising wages and, therefore, reduce their saving as
they smooth their consumption intertemporally. Moreover, newly born generations are
hurt most by the initial budgetary costs of the investment subsidies as they depend more
on human wealth than the older generations who own positive financial wealth. However,
the fall in financial assets is only temporary, as the effect of consumption smoothing falls
off when the rate at which wages rise declines. Furthermore, the intergenerational
distribution changes in favor of newly-born generations when net wages eventually rise
above their initial value.22
VII. Net foreign assets and trade performance
This section examines the effects of the investment-promoting policies on the
external accounts, which are summariud in Table 4. Net foreign assets are derived by
subtracting the value of the domestic capital stock from 6nancial assets owned by
domestic households:
~ L Á - z(q } k)
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The poliry shocks affect the initial value of net foreign assets only if foreigners own part
of the capital stock:
~(0) ' -(1 Sk) z 4(~) (7.3)
Accordingly, capitalization effects raising the value ofdomestic capital worsen the foreign
asset position if foreigners own part of the domestic capital stock. In the long run, net
foreign assets are given by (from (3.1), (3.9), (6.1), and (A.11) in Appendix A):
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The development over time of the ratio of net foreign assets to domestic income yields
the growth-adjusted external current account balance:
F -~.fiB (7.5)
r-n23
Here, fiB stands for the change in the trade balance relative to initial domestic income.
The trade balance can also be written as the difference between supply and demand for
commodities:
fiB - Y -a~Z'-a~(X tk)




T'he short-run change in the trade balance, TB(0), is found by substituting into
(7.6) the initial effects on consumption demand (from (4.1) and (5.2)) and on investment
demand (from Appendix A):
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Substituting the initial changes in net financial assets (6.3), the capital stock (from (3.2)
and (3.1)), and the value of the capital stock (from (A.11) in Appendix A) into the time
derivative of (7.1), one derives for the initial current account response:
(7.9)
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Without torefgo ownership
If domestic households initially own the entire domesdc capital stock, the policy
shocks alter neither the initial net foreign asxt position nor short-run net foreign
investment income. As a direct consequence, the change in the trade balance discounted
by the effective discount rate, r-n, is uro. Furthermore, the initial response of the trade
balance corresponds to the short-run impad on the current account.
A lower CTT worxns the inidal trade performance on acoount of not only a rise
in investment demand, but also two negative saving effects. Whereas domestic supply is
fixed in the short-run, both investment and consumpdon demand rise. The first term in
the first square brackets in (7.8) and (7.9) reprexnts the effect of higher investment
demand on domestic absorption. The xcond term in the first square brackets and the
terms on the xcond line in (7.8) and (7.9) stand for the negative saving effects associated
with a lower CIT. The term on the 5rst line involves consumption smoothing in
anticipation of a gain in intertemporal efficienry, while the terms on the second line
concern the intergenerational distributional effect in favor of the currently alive (see
Section VI).
How a smaller adjustment speed and a higher birth rate affect the magnitude of
the initial deterioration of the trade balance is ambiguous. On the one hand, they
weaken the negative saving effect of enhanced intertemporal efficienry but, on the other
hand, they strengthen the negative saving effect associated with the intergenerational
distributional effect. A smaller adjustment speed also dampens the short-run investment
response.
After iu initial deterioration, the trade balance begins to recoverbecaux of two
reasons (xe Figure 7.1). First, domestic supply meets a larger part of domestic demand
as capital accumulation raises domestic production capacity. Second, domestic demand
declines over time due to a fall in both consumption demand (xe Section V) and
investment demand. Eventually, the trade balance improves relative to the initial steady
state. The improved trade performance provides the resources to finance the larger flow
of investment income paid to foreigners abroad, which corresponds to the weaker net
foreign assets position.
Compared to a lower CIT, the TTC yields a stronger initial trade balance. The
reason is that the TTC works less in favor of the currently alive than a lower CTT dces.
Accordingly, initial consumption is lower and initial saving is higher (xe Sections V and
VI). In fact, the TTC may improve the initial trade and cunent account balances if the
saving impact of the intergenerational distributional effect in favor of future generations
is sufficiently strong to offset the positive investment effect and the negative saving effect
on account of improved intertemporal efficienry (xe Figure 7.2). This will be the case
if a small substitution elasticity between labor and capital yields small investment and
efficiency effects. Furthermore, rapid capital accumulation and a high birth rate should
cause future generations to gain substandally at the e~rpense of the currently alíve.
The long-run consequences of the TTC for net foreign asxts are ambiguous. The
substitution elasticity between capital and Iabor is an important determinant of the sign
of this effect. If this elasticity is large, net foreign asxts are likely to fall in the new
steady state, which corresponds to a stronger long-run trade performance. Intuitively,
domestic saving is not sufficient to finance the large expansion of the domestic capital
stock that is produced by the easy substitution between labor and capital. If the
substitution elasticity is small, in contrast, the TTC is likely to boost net foreign assets,25
as domestic residents accumulate foreign assets to compensate for the unanticipated
capital losses on their holdings of domestic capital produced by the lower after-tax price
of new investment goods.
With forelgn ownershlp
Foreign ownership dces not affect the long-run consequences of the two policies
for net foreign assets and the trade balance. However, unanticipated poliry shocks now
alter net foreign assets on impact as foreigners absorb the capitalized changes in after-tax
earnings on the domestic capital stock. A lower CIT worsens net foreign assets in the
short run as foreigners benefit from higher capital earnings. As a direct consequence, the
effect on the discounted trade balance is now posidve, which refleets the need to transfer
resources abroad. Indeed, compared to the case without foreign ownership, the trade
balance is stronger during the transition to a new balanced growth path (see Figure 7.1).
Intuitively, if higher capital earnings accrue to foreigners, domestic welfare is harmed,
thereby lowering domestic consumption. In fact, with foreign ownership, a lower CTT may
improve the trade balance not only in the long run but also in the short run. This is the
case if low substitution elasticity in production and slow capital accumulation induce a
weak response of short-run investment demand. At the same time, a high birth rate
should induce a strong negative consumptive response by ensuring that rising wages
produced by capital accumulation accrue to future rather than current generations. The
discount rate exceeding the interest rate also contributes to an initial trade surplus by
reducing short-run consumption. Intuitively, under these circumstances, current
generations depend more on human capital than future generations do. They, therefore,
lose most from the fall in after-tax wages.
The ITC is less beneficial to foreigners than a lower CTT. In fact, the ITC
amounts to an implicit tax on foreign owners of domestic capital if rapid adjustment
causes the value of the domestic capital stock to fall on impact. In that case, net foreign
assets improve initially. Compared to the case without foreign ownership, therefore, the
domestic economy can afford to run a larger discounted trade deficit accompanied by a
higher level of domestic consumption (see Figure 7.2).
The ITC yields a stronger initial trade balance than a lower CTT if domestic
capital is initially owned domestically. However, if foreigners own the entire domestic
capital stock, the ITC produced the weakest initial trade performance of the two
alternative policies if the discount rate exceeds the interest rate. The reason is that the
ITC yields uniformly higher after-tax earnings than a lower CTT dces, and, therefore,
benefits current generations who depend most on human capital.
VIII. Parameterized examples
This section illustrates the analytical results of this paper by presenting
quantitative estimates for the macrceconomic effects of the investment-promoting
policies. In particvlar, Tables 5 and 6 present the short-term effects of, respectively, a
lower source-based tax rate and an investment subsidy on ernnomy-wide consumption,
financial capital, human capital, and the trade balance. It also contains the two26
adjustment speeds h and h' in order to indicate how rapidly the eoonomy comerges to
its new steady state.
The specific parameter values requ'rred to carry out the simulation analysis are
presented at the end of Table 5. The initial rate of the source-based capital income tax
is 20 percent. In the benchmazk simulation, the domestic capital stock is entirely owned
by domestic residents on the initial balanced growth path, while the value for the
adjustment cost elasticity, o~, is based on an elasticity of gross imestment with respect
to marginal Q of 1, which compares to an estimate for this latter elasticity of 1~2 in
Summers (1981). The intertemporal substitution elasticity in consumption, (1~ o), is 1~2.
The substitution elasticity between labor and capital in net production is based on a
unitary elasticity in gross production. The shares of net investment and net capital
income in net income are derived from gross shares in gross income of, respectively, 17
percent and 30 percent and a depreciation share in gross income of 10 percent. The fixed
real rate of return on world capital markets and the rate of population growth amount
to, respectively, 4 and 2 percent. In the benchmark case, the probability of death is 1
percent. Table 5 examines also the sensitivity of the results with respect to alternative
assumptions regarding the elasticity of gross investment with respect to marginal Q, the
probability of death, and the share of the domestic capital stock that is owned by
domestic residents in the initial steady state.
The investment-promoting policies correspond to an investment subsidy of 1
percent. This implies that the source-based capital income tax rate is reduced by 0.8
percentage points from 20 to 19.2 percent, so as to provide the same impulse to
investment as the investment subsidy does.
Lowering the tax rate to 19.2 percent boosts initial consumption by almost 0.09
percent in the benchmark case. Higher investment and consumption demand cause the
short-run trade balance to worsen by a little over 0.2 percent of net domestic income.
The sensitivity analysis reveals that the tax cut produces the largest short-run
deterioration of the trade balance if investment is elastic and the probability of death is
large. In particular, the trade balance worsens by 0.36 percent of net domestic income
if an elasticity of gross investment with respect to Q of 4 yields high short-run
investment. The initial deterioration of the trade balance amounts to 0.33 percent of net
domestic income if a high probability of death produces a strong initial response of
consumption demand.
A lower tax rate reduces short-run consumption only if foreigners own more than
half of the domestic capital stock in the initial equilibrium. Even if foreigners own the
entire domestic capital stock initially and short-run oonsumption declines, the trade
balance still dces not improve in the short run.14
The benchmark simulation reveals that an investment subsidy, in contrast to a
lower tax rate, reduces consumption initially as current generations suffer from a fall in
their financial wealth. In particulaz, an investment subsidy of 1 percent cuts short-run
consumption by 0.07 percent. The sensitivity analysis shows that an investment subsidy
boosts initial consumption only if either the imestment elasticity is extremely low or if
foreigners initially own the entire domestic capital stock. Despite the rather weak
1~ A simulation not sbown in the tables indicates tóat the trade balana improves initially if a low
investment elasticity of 1~2 is combined with foreigu owuership.27
response of consumption demand in the short run, the initial trade balance typically
worsens, as higher investment demand more than offsets the effect oflower consumption
on aggregate domestic demand. In the benchmark case, the initial deterioration of the
trade balance amounts to about 0.08 percent of net domestic income. Only if horizons
are short (corresponding to a probability of death of 5 percent) dces the drop in
consumption demand offset higher investment demand so that the short-run trade
balance is virtually unaffected.
IX. Pareto-improving policies
This section examines three alternative ways to ensure that -- starting from an
initial distorted equilibrium -- investment-promoting policies are Pareto improving by
neutralizing the intergenerational and international distributional effects. A poliry is
defined to be distributionally neutral if it dces not affect foreigners and if all generations
at home experience the sameabsolute change in (ex ante or expected) welfare per capita.
Hence, all generations at home share in the overall efficienry gain (if tt~0) and the
investment- promoting poliry is Pareto improving. According to the above defmition,
poliry is intergenerationally neutral if two conditions are met. First, discounted capital
earnings should be unchanged. Second, following the implementation of the poliry, labor
earnings should be constant over time and reflect the overall efficienry effect:
q '(0) -0
a"~,(t) - (htr-n) t~k f 1-a,
(tk-tl)
k
where an asterisk ' indicates the case of a distributionally-neutral policy.
(9.1)
(9.2)
a. Debt policy and a wealth tax
One way to ensure that the value of the domestic capital stock is unaffected is
to offset the windfall gains or losses produced by the investment-promoting policies by
a one-time wealth tax on the domestic capital stock at the time the unanticipated poliry
shock is announced. The government uses the expropriated wealth to finance transfers
that supplement labor income. From the government budget constraint, the discotmted
value of these transfers (at time t30) equals the revenues collected from the wealth tax:28
(r-n)L!(r-n) ~
(r-nflt)
(l~k)ak(tkil) - z(~I) (93)
where Ll(s) denotes the Laplace transform of the change in debt-ftnanced lump-sum
transfers relative to domestic income, l(t).ls The time path for transfers that generates
constant labor earnings (9.2) and meets the government budget constraint is (see
Appendix C):
1(t) - tkak l~r (tk~t) [e~ - (htr-rtJ 1 k
t (1-tk)~k~k-tf) e~ - Z(~!)
(9.4)
The first term at the right hand side of (9.4) involves the efficiency effect. T'he
government initially provides positive debt-financed transfers in order to have older
generations share in the intertemporal efficienry gains, which raise wages only as capital
accumulates over time. In the long run, the government levies a tax on younger
generations to finance the earlier transfers. Hence, debt poliry transfers resources from
younger generations, who benefit from higher labor earnings, to older generations.
The other terms concern the intergenerational distributional effects. A lower CIT
requires positive transfers during the entire transition to a new steady state in order to
offset lower after-tax wages. In other words, the government ttses debt issue rather than
taxes on labor to finance part of the lower CIT. In fact, immediately after the CIT is
reduced, the government relies entirelyon debt finance. Labor taxes implemented att -0
would reduce after-tax wages because capital accumuladon has not yet raised before-tax
labor earnings. Only after capital accumulation has boosted the marginal productivity of
labor, can the government finance part of the lower CTT through higher taxes on labor
without reducing after-tax wages. However, in the absence of atty first-order efficienry
effect (tk 30), debt finance continues to play a role during the entire transition to a new
steady state. The ITC, in contrast, requires positive transfers corresponding to debt
finance only initially. Eventually, transfers become negative when capital accumulation
raises after-taxwages above their initial steady-state level. Accordingly, in the case of the
TTC, public debt is positive in the new steady state. In the case of a lower CTf, public
debt approaches zero in the long run if there are no efficienry effects (tt-0). However,
long-run public debt will be positive if a positive initial tax rate gives rise to a first-order
efficienry effect.
m
ls T6e l.aplace transform of C(t) is LG(s), where LG(S) z r e ~G(t)dt. tntuitivety, the Laplace
Jo
transform of G(t) is Ihe present value of the flow G(t) discounted at S.29
b. Debt policy and simultaneous permaneot changes in tvro inrtrudents
Rather than explicitly expropriating part of the domestic capital stock, the 5sca1
authorities can also implement a combination of the two penmanent imestment-
promoting policies in such a way that the value of the domestic capital stock does not
change. Using (3.4), one finds that the shaze of the investment subsidy, -~~, in the total
investment impuLse, (k-i'~), equals:




A slower speed of capital accumulation requires a larger role for the investment subsidy.
If slow adjustment causes the TTC to raise the value of capital, the ITC share may even
exceed unity so that, instead of falling, the CIT rises on impact. Intuidvely, with slow
adjustment, capital owners tend to bene6t from investment-promoting poliàes.
Accordingly, the government needs to increase the CTT to offset the undesired
capitalization effects, while using the TTC to provide the stimulus to investment. Solving
for the public transfers that aze required to meet (9.2), one finds (see Appendix C):
1(t) - I tkak
ak
1-ak k k k
htr-n
;(1-tkr I( -ll)fe~-( r-n
JJ
(9.~
In contrast to the first distributionally-neutral policy, discounted transfers are uro
because the government starts with uro public debt. After the imestment-promoting
policies are implemented, the government starts to accumulate public debt when it
provides debt-financed transfers to labor to offset an inidal fall in after-tax wages.ló
Eventually, however, debt-financed transfers beoome negative when capital accumulation
causes after-tax wages to exceed their initial steady-state level. On the new balanced
growth path, taxes on labor finance the interest costs assoàated with a positive level of
public debt. In effect, part of the budgetary costs of the im~estment-promoting policy is
shifted to younger generations who benefit from these poliàes through higher before-tax
wages. Indeed, the taxes required to service the public debt can be interpreted as a
"benefit tax".
16 An alternative interpretation is that thegovernment usea delx issue rather lóan labor tauea to finana
the investment-promoting policies.30
c. Time-varying tiscal policies withont debt polfcy
The govemment dces not have to adopt debt poliry to ensure that the
investment-promoting policies are Pareto improving. In particular, it can vary over time
the weight of the investment subsidy in the total permanent imestment impuls in such
a way that the return to human capital meets (92). Using (3.7), (3.8), and (3.9) and
solving for (9.2) one finds:
z~t~i) - I(l~k~k 'rrP~k 1~kJ e ~ -(r-,~.k)1~k ~-~k ~9~~
k - I) `
The weight of the ITC exceeds unity in the short run. However, if the initial CIT is
positive, the TTC falls below zero in the long run. Intuitively, investment-promoting
policies decrease after-tax wages in the short run but increase them above their
sustainable level given by (9.2) in the long run. Therefore, the combination of the two
policies needs to transfer resources to labor in the short run but to tax labor in the long
run. At the same time, the poliry mix should provide a constant cembined investment
impuls (ik-t~).
Initially, the capital stock and, therefore, before-taxwages are fixed. Accordingly,
the government cannot use labor taxes to finance the investment-promoting policies
because doing so would violate (9.2). Instead, the CIT is raised to provide the budgetary
funds to finance the investment subsidy. Intuitively, old capital is taxed to subsidize
marginal investment. As time elapses, capital accumulation raises before-tax wages and
the government gradually reduces the CIT, as it now can levy taxes on labor to finance
investment incentives while keeping after-tax wages from rising above (9.2). At the same
time, the ITC is reduced. Eventually, the CTT is decreased compared to its initial steady-
state level. On the new balanced growth path, the TTC is completely eliminated if the
initial tax rate is zero. If a positive tax rate yields a positive efficienry effect, the
government taxes labor in order to scale back labor earnings to their disceunted
efficienry gain and uses the revenues to further reduce the CI1'. At the same time, the
governntent levies a positive investment tax in order to offset the excessive investment
incentives originating from the reduction in the CTT.
d. The macroeconomic etYects of Pareto-improving policies
Distributionally-neutral policies yield the following path for consumption:31
.-0
a~~ (t~ ~ h tr-rt tk~k (1-a , (t k -t ~~ 1 - n,g e ~
.~ (9.8)
k
Consumption is fixed at its initial value if the initial tax rate on capital is zero. In the
presence ofafust-order gain in intertemporal efficienry, however, the policies are Pareto
improving and consumption rises on impact. Consumption stays constant at its higher
level only if the interest rate equals the discount rate. In that case, fïnancial wealth is
zero and the rise in human wealth implies the same rielative change in welfare for all
generations. However, ifolder generations hold positive fínancial wealth (i.e. r~ S), they
gain relativety less from higher human wealth because they depend less on human wealth
for their consumption. Hence, consumption rises as younger generations who benefit
relatively more are born.
The trade balance deteriorates initially due to an increase in investment demand,
and if the initial tax rate on capital is positive, an increase in consumption demand. In
the long run, the trade perfomiance improves due to the capacity effect of investment.
X. Conclusions
Using an intertemporal equiGbrium model, this paper showed how
intergenerational and international distribution effects, in addition to intertemporal
efficienry effects, affect the macrceconomic consequences of investment-promoting
policies. Whereas intergenerational distributional effects may weaken the initial
expansionary effects of the TTC, they strengthen the short-run positive effects on
domestic absorption exerted by a lower CTT if foreigners do not own any domestic
capital when the policies are implemented. In particular, without foreign ownership of
domestic capital, intergenerational redistribution caused by a lower CIT boosts initial
consumption at the expense of future consumption, especially if both the birth rate and
the adjustment costs in investment are high. Accordingly, these effects on the timing of
consumption strengthen the initial deterioration and eventual improvement of the trade
balance associated with the initial demand effects and eventual supply effects of capital
accumulation. The TTC, in contrast, may reduce consumption initially if rapid capital
accumulation causes a redistribution from current to future generations. The associated
positive saving effect may be sufficiently strong to entirely finance the investment impulse
if the birth rate is high. Accordingly, the ITC may cause the trade balance to improve
on impact.
In contrast to the domestic intergenerational redistributional effects, the
international redistributional effects of a lower CTT dampen the expansionary effects of
the stimulus to investment. In particular, if foreigners own part of the domestic capital
stock, a lower CIT results in a redistribution of wealth away from domestic households -
- including those who are alive at the time of the poliry shock - to foreigners. Hence,
domestic current constunption falls and, therefore, makes room to transfer resources
abroad through an improved trade performance. The international redistribution of the32
ITC, in oontrast, boosts domestic rnnsumption if rapid capital acxumulation results in a
windfall loss for foreigners.
The paper explores a number of ways to neutraliu the intergenerational
distributional effects of the investment-promoting policies in order to azrive at Pazeto-
improving policies. For example, instead of using current taxes to balancx its budget at
each point in time, the government can use debt policy to shift the bt~rden of financing
the investment incentives to younger generations, who benefit from capital accumulation.
In particular, the government can issue debt to 5nance the initial budgetary costs
associated with investment-promoting policies in order to relieve the burden on older
generations. Younger generations, who benefit from higher wages produced by capital
accumulation, pay part of the budgetary oosts of the investment-promoting policies by
servicing the additional public debt. The paper also showed that the government can
employ tax poliry to arrive at the same intergenerational distribution as achieved by
explicit debt poliry. In pazticular, it can boost capital accumulation by initially relying
(mainly) on the TTC financed by a higher CTT. As the capital stock expands, the
government increasingly resorts to a lower CIT financed by taxes on labor.
The study provided a number of lessons for modelling the impact of fiscal
policies on international trade and capital flows. First, the modelling of the interaction
between, on the one hand, disconnected generations determining aggregate saving, and,
on the other hand, adjustment costs affecting investment behavior, gives rise to
intergenerational distributional effects, which potentially exert powerful macrceconomic
effects. Second, foreign ownership can generate international distribution effects, which
may impact domestic consumption and trade performance. Third, two-period models
cannot fully characterize the dynamics generated by the intergenerational distributional
effects of investment incentives. In particular, the study revealed that investment-
promoting policies can yield important non-monotonicities in consumption and asset
accumulation.33
Notation'~
Aggregate variables measured per capita:
C Consumption demand
k Capital stock
y Domestic supply of commodities (net of depreciation)
A Financial wealthb~
H Human wealth
F Net foreign assetsb~
Other variables:
x Ratio of the net investment demand to capital stock
Price variables:
w Before-tax wage
~ After-tax labor earnings
q Shadow price of domestic capital stock
r Rate of return on worid financial markets
Tax ratesb~:
tk Tax rate on capital income (net of depreciation)
t~ Subsidy rate on net investment
Parameters:
n Rate of population growth
S Rate of time preference
h Speed of capital accvmulation
(l~a) Intertemporal substitution elasticity in rnnsumption
ox Elasticity of the marginal productivity of net investment in installation
ok Substitution elasdcity between capital and labor in net production
Shares in domestic output:
~k Capital income (net of depreciation)
n~ Net investment
z - (1-tk)ak-a~ttkd Cash flow34
Notation - Continued
a~ Private consumption
a~, - (1-ak);tkak After-tax labor earnings
a) A dot above avariable denotes a time derivative and, unless indicated otherwise,
a tilde represents a change relative to the initial steady-state equilibrium.
b) A tilde above a tax or subsidy rate t~; n-k, I is de5ned as d(1-t~)~(1-tn).
A tilde above A is defined as (r-n)dA~y. }~` is defined analogously.35
APPEI~IDIX A: THE INVE.STMEN'I' SYSTEM
Steady-state relationships
The elasticities in the log-linearized model are assumed to be fixed at their values in the
initial steady-state equilibrium. In order to express these elasticities in terms of observable
shares, the paper uses two steady-state relationships ((A.1) and (A.4) below) that follow
from (2.11) and (2.14), respectively.
On a balanced growth path, the capital-labor ratio is constant. AcootdinglY, (2.11)
yields the following steady-state relationship:
g(x) - n
Setting the left-hand side of (2.14) equal to zero and using (A.1) one derives:
(A.1)
(r-n)q - (1 -tk)Í(k) - (1 -t~)x (A.2)
On the initial balanced growth path, the investment subsidy is assumeá to be zero (see
Sub-section 11.4):
tf - 0 (A.3)
Substituting (A.3) into (A.2), one finds the following steady-state relationship between the
capital-output ratio and the share of the cashflow in output, z:
(r-n)
f(k) - z - (1 -tk)ak-a~
The log-linearized model
The dynamic equations are found by log-linearizing (2.1 I) and (2.14), respectively:
~f - g'(x)x z
(A.4)
(A.S)36
Q - ( (1-tt)q '(k)kl k t ( (1-raf (k) - (1-tax~
4
Il J Il 4
- ( ar l l(1 -tq (k)1
i~ . (1 -tt)q (~ . t!) - g'(x)x~
(A.6)
In order to eliminate ~ from (A.5) and (A.6), one uses the following log-linearized
version of (2.15):
4 - o~~ ' tr (A.~
Then the steady-state elasticities in (A.5) and (A.6) are rewritten by eGminating g'(x)
from (2.15), eliminating q from (A.4), imposing (A.3), and using the definition of at:
f(k)
at - - f,,,(k)k (1 -at)
This procedure gives rise to the two-dimensional investment system:













7'he long-run solution for the capital-labor ratio (3.1) is derived by setting the left-hand
side of (A.9) equal to zero and solving for k(~) . Expression (3.3) for the adjustment
speed to the new long-run equilibrium, h, is computed as the absolute value of the stable
(i.e. negative) root of the first elasticity matrix at the right-hand side of (A.9). According-








h(htr-n) - (1 tk)ak a~ (1 at) (
r-n)2 - 0 (A.10)
z toj ot
The initial jump of the value of the domestic capital stock, q(0), is found by substituting
the solution for the capital-labor ratio (from (3.1) and (3.2)) into the first row of (A.9):
a h t
(ït -it)t -w -
r-n 1-ak -
ar
a z (tF(t) - [l) (A.11)
:
Using (A.10) to eliminate the elasticities oz and ok, one arrives at (3.4).
After-tax labor earnings are derived by substituting (2.10) into (2.16) to eliminate
w and log-linearizing the resulting equation:
a~w - Itkak t (1 -tk)ak
ll oa4~1 ~ } ar[f
- (1 -tk)a4tt (A.12)
l t
where (A.3) and (A.8) have been used to rewrite the elasticities. Expressions (3.7), (3.8),
and (3.9) are derived from (A.12) by substituting the time-path for the capital-labor ratio
(from (3.1) and (3.2)).
The relative change in human wealth (3.10) follows from log-linearizing the
definition of human wealth:
H(t) - f ~(S)e-t,.e,4,-nds
~
according to:




Substituting (3.7), (3.8), and (3.9) into (A.14), one finds (3.10).38
APPENDIX B: THE SAVING SYSTEM
Dynamic equatioas
The saving system consists of two dynamic equations in aggregate consumption, C, and
financial wealth, A. The dynamic oquation for consumption is found by differentiating
(2.6) with respect to time:
~(r)-s~~(r) }~(r)~
(B.1)
The time derivatives at the right hand side of (B.I) are rewritten by using the time
derivative of (A.13)
f!(t) - (r.9)H(t) - c,~(t)
and (2.T). This yields:
~`(r) - I r-aJ





In order to manipulate the elasticities, this appendia derives a number of sceady-state
relationships. Imposing the steady-state condition on (B.3), one finds the following
expression linking A and C on a balanced-growth path:
.-a
A - " ~ C
~(n tA)





The steady-state relationship between consumption and after-tax labor eamings is found by39
substituting (B.4) and (B.5) into (2.6):
~ ad h'(r} e)
C- a~ - ~(n 4 9)
where h' is defined in (5.4).
T6e log-Gnearized model
Log-linearizing (B.3) and (2.7) produces the saving system:
o r-b (n.8)A
C(t) a a~(r - n)
`f(t) ~ - - r-n a r-n ( ) ~
~(r) 0




where the time path for after-tax labor earnings, i.i(t), is derived from the investment
system (see equations (3.7), (3.8), and (3.9)).
The saving system (B.7) is solved by using Laplace transforms. The Laplace
transform, Lo(s), of a function p(t) is defined by:
L~(s) - f e-'p(r)dr
0
(B.S)
The Appendix uses the following expression for the Laplace transform of the time
derivative of a function p(t)
Ly(s) - f c-Y p(t)dt- sL(s) - p(0)
0
(B.9)
Taking the Laplace transforms of (B.7) and using (B.9), one can solve for the Laplace





a~(r - n)L6(s) t A(0)
where the determinant D(s)of the elasticity matriz is defined by:




The short-run change in financial wealth, Á(0), is given from the investment system by
(3.5) and (3.4). To pin down the initial change in consumption, ~(0), one uses the
condition that L~(r.9) is bounded.' This implies that the first row of the right-hand side
of (B.10) should be zero which gives rise to:
t-fl a-~` C(0) - ~r(On) Té (0)






In fact, (B.12) is the log-linearized version of (2.6) for t-0. Substituting (3.5), (3.4),
and (3.10) into (B.12), one derives (4.1) and (5.2).
The time path for aggregate consumption (S.l) is derived by substituting (B.12)
and (B.13) into the first row of (B.10) to eliminate the initial change in financial wealth:
' See, e.g., Judd (1982). This latter paper explains the use of Laplace transforms to solve for linearized
perfect-foresight models.41
L~(s) -( s -~s)A) ~ C(0) t f e(D(s~áa„ 1~ La(r t9) -La(s) ~ l l ~J
(B.14)
By using (3.~, (3.8), and (3.9), one can write the last term in square brackets at the
right-hand side of (B.14) as:
L8(r f 9) -L~s(s) - tv(0) - i~(~) t~(~)
[s -(r t9)] (h .r f 9)(h }s) (r .9)s










Invertíng the Iaplace transforms, one arrives at (5.1) and (5.3).
The sewnd row of (B.10) is used to find the time path forfinancia! ~r~ealth (6.2).
Eliminating the initial jump in consumption, G(0), from (B.12), and using (B.11), one
can rewrite this row as follows:
L~{s) -
a~(r - n)t1~L~(s) -L~(r t 9)~ a~(r -rt)La(s) .Á(0)
D(s) } (s t h')
(B.1~
T'he Laplace transform of after-tax labor earnings is found by using (3.~, (3.8), and
(3.9):
L~(s) -
lï~(0) - i~(~)] ; w()
(h .s) s
(B.18)
Substituting (B.15) and (B.18) into (B.1~, one finds:42
L,~(s) -~ s Ih~ J
A(0) t a~(r-n)(I -;eg1 s(s(h l l ` ~
. Q~(,-R, I ~ f ~(0)-~(~)
[ - (htr~8)J l(s.h)(s.b7
(B.19)






one arrives at (6.1) and (6.2).43
APPENDIX C: PARETO-IMPROVING TAX REFORM
T'he time path for transfers that maintains after-tax labor earnings at the level given by
(9.2) meets the following relation:
j(t) } a„~(t) - a„~'(t) (C.1)
where f(t) represents the change in debt-financed lump-sum transfers reladve to domestic
income and i~(t) is defined by expressions (3.~, (3.8), and (3.9). Substituting these latter
equations as well as (9.2) into (C.1) to eliminate, mspecdvely, Gi(t) and Gi'(t), one
arrives at (9.4). Expression (9.6) is found by using (9.5) to eliminate t~ from (9.4).
Finally, (9.~ is derived from (C.1) by setting ~(t) equal to zero.44
Table 1: Impact effects on real wealtó (and consumption) of curreatly alive




f f 4~ - ~~
1) This effect vanishes if tk, ok or h aze zero. It increases with tk, ot and h.
2) This effect vanishes if (n t 9) or st aze zero. It increases with (n t9) and st.
3) This effect vanishes if st is one. It decreases with st.
4) This effect is large in absolute value if h is small.
5) t if h is small. - if h is lazge.
6) - if h is small. f if h is large.45





G(U) G(U) C.`(m) n L`(4)
f fl-3) f
distribution (st-1)'t f - ~- 0
international
distribution (st-0) - -It 6~ f 0
-t~~0:
intergenerational
distribution (sk-1)5j tl-~ -li-"t f t
inteniational
distribution (st-0) -If at fl- 9t f f
.
1) C~`(n) for n very large.
2) This effect is the same for both investment-promoting policies. It dominates if h,tt
and ot are large or (n t 9) is small and sr -1.
3) f if r~b. - if r~b.
4) Unless r ~b, h is large, and n t 8 is small.
5) This effect dominates if (n.9) is large.
6) - if r~d. t if r~b.
7) t if h is large. - if h is large.
S) - if h is small. t if h is large.
9) - if r~b and h small or if r~b and h large
t if r~b and h largc or if r~b and h small.46




















- ~t -~I- 2~
1) This effect is the same for both investment-promoting policies. IC dominates if á,tk
and ok are large.
2) t if riE. - if r~b.
3) T'his effect dominates if (n t A) is large.
4) Unless r~E and h is (very) small.
5) - if h is large. f if h is small.
6) t if h and (n t 9) are large. - otherwise.47
Tabk 4: Effects on external trade account, exteroal current account, and net [orei~n
assets
Compgnent:





distribution (St-I)3~ p p
international
distribution (st-p) f - -F'~ p
-t~~0:
intergenerational
distribution (st -1) 3~ f~- s~ 0 -If s~ f
international
distribution (st-p) -It 6~ fl- st f~ f
1) This effect is the same for both investment-promoting policies. It dominates if h andok
aze lazge.
2) Unless r~ b, n t9 is small, and tk is large.
3) This effect dominates if (n t6) is large.
4) Unless r~ b and h or (n t9) are small.
5) t if h is lazge. - if h is small.
6) - if h is large. i- if h is small.
7) Unless r~b and both 6 is small and (nt9) is small.48
Table S: Macroeconomic effects of a pertnanent decresse in the tax rate on capital
income from 20 percent to 19.2 percent'~.
Benchmark
case Domestic ownership share
0.75 0.50 0.25 0.0
G(0) 0.086 0.040 -0.006 -0.052 -0.099
.4(0) 0.073 0.054 0.036 0.018 0.0
fl(0) -0.118 b) b) b) b)
7B(0) -0.212 -0.172 -0.131 -0.090 -0.049
h 0.029 b) b) b) b)
h' 0.025 b) b) b) b)
Elasticity of gross investment with respect to marginal Q
4.0 2.0 0.5 0.2
C(0) 0.052 0.065 0.115 0.161
Á(0) 0.042 0.056 0.093 0.120
H(0) -0.064 -0.091 -0.144 -0.173
TB(0) -0.356 -0.266 -0.188 -0.187
h 0.066 0.044 0.019 0.010
h' b) b) b) b)Table S (continued)
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Probability of death
-0.Ol 0.00 0.02 0.05
L`(0) 0.024 0.055 0.119 0.229
Á(0) b) b) b) b)
H(0) -0.085 -0.104 -0.129 -0.151
TB(0) -0.169 -0.189 -0.239 -0.326
k b) b) b) b)
k' 0.005 0.015 0.035 0.065
a) Benchmark parameter values are: net investment share ar - 0.078; net capital income
share at - 0.222; rate ofcapital income ta~c tt - 0.2; substitution elasticity between
labour and capital in net production or - 0.741; elasticity of net inveshnent with
respect to matginai Q(1~o~J - 9.9; intertemporal substitutian elastxity in consumption(Ilc)
- 0.5; real world rate of return r- 0.04; population growth n- 0.02; rate of time
preference b - 0.0375.
b) Same effect as in benchmark simulation.Table 6: Macroeconomic effects of the introduc~tion of a permaneot investment subsidy
of 1 percent'~.
13enchmark
case Domestic ownership share
0.75 0.50 0.25 0.0
C~(0) -0.066 -0.049 -0.032 -0.014 0.003
Á(0) -0.027 -0.021 -0.014 -0.007 0.0
B(0) 0.003 b) b) b) b)
7B(0) -0.078 -0.093 -0.109 -0.123 -0.139
Elasticity of gross investment with respect to
marginal Q
4.0 2.0 0.5 0.2
C`(0) -0.100 -0.087 -0.040 0.009
Á(0) -0.059 -0.045 -0.007 0.020
B(0) 0.058 0.031 -0.023 -0.052
7B(0) -0.221 -0.131 -0.054 -0.05151
Table 6 (continued)
Probability of death
-0.O1 0.00 0.02 0.05
~(0) -0.007 -0.037 -0.094 -0.166
Á(0) b) b) b) b)
H(0) 0.037 0.018 -0.008 -0.030
7B(0) -0.128 -0.101 -0.056 0.001
a) For benchmark parameter values, see Table 5.
b) Same effect as in benchmark simulation.References
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